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IMPLICATIONS OF REPUTATION ECONOMICS ON
REGULATORY REFORM OF THE CREDIT RATING
INDUSTRY
PAUL LASELL BoNEwrrz*
ABSTRACT
Credit rating agencies have for years averred that they would never
intentionally issue or maintain inaccurate ratings due to the damage their
reputation, and therefore their business, would suffer as a result. The
reputation of credit rating agencies perhaps never suffered more than
when thousands of structured debt securities proved to hold inflated
ratings during the run-up to the credit crisis. Yet credit rating agencies
remain as ingrained as ever in the global financial system. What is more,
congressional testimony shows that credit rating agencies had the ability
to rate more accurately, but intentionally failed to do so. Therefore, credit
rating agencies inwardly believed that their reputations with investors
were not nearly as valuable as they outwardly claimed. Their ability to
thrive while their reputations languish proves that they were right.
Reputation mechanisms theoretically operate in the credit rating
industry to solve problems of information asymmetry. Whereas investors
cannot trust issuers to truthfully convey their own credit risk, a credit
rating agency must guard its reputation and the related promise of future
business due to the comparatively small fee it earns for each opinion it
provides. The actual credit rating industry, however, differs from the
model in several ways that have the potential to undermine reputational
incentives. Regulations tied to credit ratings give Nationally Recognized
Statistically Rating Organizations (NRSROs) the power to sell cost-
reducing and demand-increasing regulatory compliance to issuers.
Further, regulatory and market factors may increase the short-term
profitability of falsifying ratings or diminish the long-term profitability of
reputation-building.
The current statutory and regulatory regime governing credit rating
agencies ignores these barriers to accuracy. The Credit Rating Agency
Reform Act of 2006 (CRARA) and the SEC regulations thereunder instead
* Associate, Latham & Watkins LLP; J.D., St. John's University School of Law;
B.A., Tufts University.
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assume that making the credit rating industry more transparent, more
competitive, and less conflicted will restore the quality of credit ratings.
By providing investors with more information and more choices, the
CRARA largely aims to enable investors to accurately assess agencies'
reputations and hold them accountable for issuing or maintaining
inaccurate ratings. Despite the manifest failings of credit rating agencies
since 2006 and the unaddressed theoretical barriers to an effective
reputation mechanism in the credit rating industry, the Treasury
Department recently endorsed continuing to regulate credit rating
agencies under the current system.
In place of these measures, successful reform efforts must either
restore the role of reputation in the credit rating industry or obviate the
need for it. Proposals in the latter category face difficulties that make
them either impractical or ineffective. Dismantling the NRSRO super-
structure, meanwhile, would remove the principal barrier to reputation
economics. To fill the void left by ending ratings-based regulation,
regulated investors would be given primary responsibility to certify risk,
but would also be allowed to rely on credit spreads as a safe harbor. Such
a solution would both produce accurate ratings and protect investors
without overburdening regulated institutions.
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INTRODUCTION
From the outset of the financial crisis, credit rating agencies have been
among the institutions most targeted for heightened regulatory oversight.
While efforts to restore liquidity to credit markets largely overshadowed
regulatory reform for months, recent relative stability has allowed renewed
focus on financial regulation. Chief among new proposals is the Treasury
Department's June 2009 plan to rebuild regulation of financial institutions,
which suggests reforming credit rating agencies by continuing and stren-
gthening the regulatory tools the SEC already possesses under a statute
Congress enacted in 2006.1 The plan is therefore remarkable for relying on
the wisdom of a statute that predates the crisis to which it is responding.
That statute, the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act (CRARA),
assumes that making the credit rating industry more transparent, more
competitive, and less conflicted will restore the quality of credit ratings.
2
By providing investors more information and more choices, the CRARA
aims to enable investors to hold rating agencies accountable for issuing
and maintaining inaccurate ratings. While the power of reputational
concerns to influence the behavior of informational intermediaries such as
credit rating agencies is well established, the means the CRARA employs
deserve scrutiny. The CRARA focuses on important objectives, but it
ignores factors that diminish the value of reputation in the credit rating
industry. Most significantly, regulations tied to credit ratings issued by
SEC-designated rating agencies make such ratings valuable regardless of
their accuracy, which entices issuers to purchase ratings even if investors
do not trust them. In addition, market and regulatory forces that drive up
the short-term profitability of selling credit ratings or drive down long-
term rents reduce the value of reputation-building activity. As a result,
credit rating agencies have strong incentives to maintain compensation
systems, business models, and even rating methodologies that produce
inaccurate ratings. Supporting this view is evidence that for years Standard
& Poor's (S&P) intentionally failed to implement a model its executives
knew more accurately reflected the risk of structured debt products
supports this view.
3
Rating agencies have shown that they are both able and willing to
conceal inaccuracy in their rating methodologies. The CRARA, however,
not only fails to address the incentives that distort the reputation
1. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREAsURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW
FOUNDATION 3 (2009).
2. Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327.
3. See infra notes 67-69, 174-75 and accompanying text.
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mechanism, it expressly proscribes the SEC from regulating rating agency
procedures or methodologies. In August of 2009, the Treasury Department
also adopted the CRARA's position when it asserted that whatever the
administration might do, it would not seek to regulate the business model,
the methodologies, or the performance of the credit rating agencies.4 This
Article agrees with the prudence of this limitation and the related prop-
osition that the SEC is not equipped to mandate methodologies, but asserts
that successful reform must then remove or override the perverse incent-
ives that currently infect the industry. Both regulatory and deregulatory
approaches could accomplish this objective. New reforms could condition
SEC certification of rating agencies directly on accuracy. In the alterna-
tive, dismantling the certification process could restore an efficient
reputation mechanism. This Article addresses each of these options in turn
and concludes that restoring the economic incentives that successfully
animate informational intermediaries in other industries to strive for
accuracy would be more effective than imposing new rules that certified
rating agencies would have both the motivation and the capacity to
circumvent.
Part I of this Article describes first the problem of information
asymmetry generally, and second the ability of reputed intermediaries to
credibly signal product quality. This Part proceeds to discuss informat-
ional asymmetry in the credit rating industry and the role of credit rating
agencies in credibly signaling the quality of bonds to prospective invest-
tors. Part I concludes by discussing the two primary factors that disrupt the
reputation mechanism in the credit rating industry: the value of regulatory
licenses and the delta between long-term and short-term returns necessary
to incentivize reputation-building activity.
Part II begins by tracing efforts to reform the credit rating industry
from the failures of corporate bond ratings in 2001 and 2002 through the
enactment of the CRARA. It then describes the collapse of structured debt
products beginning in the spring and summer of 2007 and the studies,
congressional hearings, and SEC rule proposals that followed. Part II
evaluates the extent to which the CRARA and the rules promulgated
thereunder achieve their intermediate goals of competition, transparency,
and accountability, and the extent to which these intermediate goals, even
if they are achieved, are likely to produce accurate ratings.
4. See Examining Proposals to Reform the Credit Rating Agencies Before the S.
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 11 Ith Cong. 3 (2009) (statement of
Michael S. Barr, Assistant Secretary, Financial Institutions).
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Part III categorizes solutions to the failure of reputation as falling
within two categories: those that abandon the Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organization (NRSRO) designation entirely and those
that use the NRSRO designation to coerce NRSROs to submit themselves
to regulation likely to produce accurate ratings. This Part finds that the
first category is theoretically viable, but is likely to encounter practical
impediments. Within the second category, this Part argues that only con-
ditions that remove the need for the reputation mechanism, such as
proscribing the issuer-pays conflict, and those that directly condition
NRSRO status on credit rating accuracy are viable alternatives. This Part
discusses the major benefits and drawbacks of each tenable proposal and
concludes that abandoning the NRSRO designation would best produce
accurate ratings.
I. THE REPUTATION MECHANISM
In generally accepted economic theory, reputation mechanisms operate
to reduce information asymmetry between prospective buyers and sellers.
Through signaling, a third party facilitates a transaction, telling the buyer
something the buyer could not trust the seller to tell him or her. Such
problems exist throughout the economy. To name just a few examples,
economists have identified information asymmetries in the markets for
used cars,5 long-term life insurance policies, coffins, and ballet instru-
ction.6 In the credit rating industry, a rating agency reduces an issuer's
cost of capital by providing a signal of creditworthiness-the rating-to
prospective investors. Rating agencies have for years maintained, in cong-
ressional hearings, to media outlets, and in their own publications, that
they would never risk the certain and devastating damage to their
reputation-their most valuable asset, their franchise, their brand-that
would result from issuing or maintaining false ratings.
7
5. See infra notes 8-14 and accompanying text.
6. See Posting of Stephen J. Dubner to Freakonomics, http://freakonomics.blogs.
nytimes.com/2008/06/09/ballerinas-and-information-asymmetry/ (June 9, 2008, 11:52
EST).
7. See Credit Rating Agencies and the Financial Crisis Before the H. Comm. on
Oversight and Gov't Reform, I 11th Cong. 41 (2008) [hereinafter Financial Crisis
Hearing] (statement of Jerome Fons, former executive, Moody's Corporation) ("[T]he
franchise derives from the reputation that the firms have."); Bo BECKER & TODD
MILBOURN, HARvARD Bus. SCH., REPUTATION AND COMPETITION: EvIDENCE FROM THE
CREDIT RATING INDusTRY 2 (2008) (citing a Bear Steams & Co. analyst who in June
2007 claimed that "reputation is more important than revenues"). In March 2008,
Moody's CEO Raymond McDaniel stated that "[wle are in a business where reputational
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But in markets generally and the credit rating industry in particular, a
number of factors can disrupt the incentive for the intermediary to protect
its reputation. For rating agencies, these influences come largely in two
forms: (1) the regulatory value of credit ratings, which competes with and
may even displace the informational value of ratings, and (2) the gradual
nature of reputation-building activity, which requires that rating agencies
forego certain short-term profits for uncertain but theoretically larger
returns that building and preserving a strong reputation would produce.
This Part describes how reputation mechanisms work generally, how rep-
utation works in the credit rating industry, and the impediments particular
to the industry that may cause credit rating agencies to subordinate their
reputation to other considerations.
A. Information Asymmetry and Signaling Solutions
Reputation mechanisms theoretically operate in the credit rating indu-
stry to solve the problem of information asymmetry. Nobel Prize winning
economist George Akerlof explained the potential destructive power of
information asymmetry on markets in his seminal 1970 paper on the
market for used cars.8 When one party to a potential transaction, the seller
in the case of used cars, knows information about a product's quality that
he or she cannot credibly convey to the buyer, the buyer is forced to
assume the product is of average quality. 9 All products in such a market
will therefore trade at the same price.' 0 Would-be sellers of above average
cars will know this and remove their cars from the market." The result is
that only the lemons sell, and only then at basement prices.'2 In a market
of continuous product quality, the bad will drive out the mediocre, which
will drive out the so-so, which will drive out the pretty good, which will
capital is more important." Mark Pittman, Moody's, S&P Defer Cuts on AAA Subprime,
Hiding Loss, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 11, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.comlapps/news?pid=
20601109&sid=aRLWzHsF16lY.
8. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, Q.J. ECON., Aug. 1970, at 488-500.
9. Id. at 489.
10. Id. at 490 ("[T]he bad cars sell at the same price as good cars since it is
impossible for a buyer to tell the difference between a good and a bad car; only the seller
knows.").
11. Id. at 489.
12. See id.
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drive out the good. 13 In the extreme case, the market will collapse enti-
rely.
14
Co-Nobel Prize winner Michael Spence provided a partial solution to
the information asymmetry problem in his 1973 article, Job Market
Signaling.15 In Spence's model scenario, prospective employees and empl-
oyers are sellers and buyers of labor.' 6 Good employees know that they
are worth more than average, but need a way to credibly signal this infor-
mation to employers. 17 Spence argues that the signal of education can
bridge this gap.' 8 Education credentials credibly signal an ability to learn
and are therefore valuable regardless of whether graduates in fact learned
or retained any information pertinent to their subsequent employment. The
educational institution, by issuing a degree, in effect certifies the grad-
uate's ability to learn. The employer in turn trusts the certification,
knowing that the harm to the institution's reputation would be far greater
than any benefit it could reap by issuing an unearned degree.
Credit rating agencies operate in a similar theoretical framework.
Issuers are selling bonds, investors are considering purchasing bonds, and
the credit agency serves as the reputed intermediary providing a credible
signal of the issuer's creditworthiness.19 In the unadulterated setting, credit
rating agencies operate as informational intermediaries between debt
issuers and investors. 20 The signal an agency provides-the credit rating-
is its evaluation of either an issuer's or a debt instrument's relative
13. Id. at 490.
14. See id.
15. See Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, Q.J. ECON., Aug. 1973, at 355-74.
16. See id. at 356-57.
17. See id. at 357-58.
18. See id. at 358.
19. See Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other
Gatekeepers, in FINANCIAL GATEKEEPERS: CAN THEY PROTECT INVESTORS? 81, 81-89
(Yasuyuki Fuchita & Robert E. Litan eds., 2006). In addition, ratings are valuable for
reasons apart from their ability to produce unique informational content. By performing
rating analysis in volume, credit rating agencies benefit from economies of scale. Id. at
634. By incorporating information not disclosed under the securities laws and using
secret procedures and methodologies, rating agencies arguably perform default risk
analysis more accurately than the market. Id. So long as ratings are accurate and analyze
default risk more efficiently than can either investors or issuers, they reduce the cost of
capital to issuers and the cost of information to investors. Id.
20. FABIAN DITFRICH, THE CREDIT RATING INDUSTRY: COMPETITION AND REG-
ULATION 9 (2007). "In neo-institutional finance theory rating agencies can be depicted as
informational intermediaries. They are consulted in the course of a market transaction in
order to overcome informational asymmetries between both market sides. In short, they
create value by reducing information costs in the marketplace." Id.
398
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probability of default. 21 These qualitative statements of risk are designated
by number and letter grades that vary only slightly between the major
agencies.22 The problem for both sides is that a claim of creditworthiness
itself does not carry any reliable information; signaling is only effective to
the extent that the signal is trustworthy.23 Issuers cannot credibly signal
their own credit risk due to the strong incentive they have to misrepresent
or withhold information about an offering.24 A rating agency, on the other
hand, receives a comparatively small fee for each opinion it provides, a fee
that pales in comparison to the damage its reputation would suffer if the
agency provided a demonstrably false opinion. 5 Credit rating agencies are
therefore trustworthy informational intermediaries because they cannot
afford to give false signals.
26
B. Challenges to Reputation Economics in the Credit Rating Industry
The actual credit rating industry differs from the economic model in
several ways that have the potential to undermine reputational incentives.
First and most notoriously, the industry operates in a regulatory regime
that gives certified rating agencies the power to sell cost-reducing and
demand-increasing regulatory compliance to issuers. 27 The regulatory
component of credit rating value gives issuers an incentive to purchase
untrustworthy ratings even though investors would not value them for
their informational content.
Second, regulatory and market factors may increase the short-term
profitability of falsifying ratings or diminish the long-term profitability of
reputation-building, distorting the balance of incentives necessary to
promote rating agency investment in reputation.28 Building a reputation is
21. See, e.g., Siegfried Utzig, The Role Played by Credit Rating Agencies in the
Financial Crisis (ADBInstitute, Working Paper No. 188, 2010), available at
http://www.adbi.org/working-paper/2010/01/26/3446.credit.rating.agencies.european.
banking/the.role.played.by.credit.rating.agencies.in.the.financial.crisis/.
22. See Moodys.com, Moody's Rating Symbols & Definitions, http://v3.moodys.
com/sites/products/aboutmoodysratingsattachments/moodysratingssymbolsand% 2 0
definitions.pdf; ForexTheory.com, Standard and Poor's Rating Scale, http://www.forex
theory.comladditional-info/standard-and-poors-rating-scale.html.
23. DITrRICH, supra note 20, at 9.
24. Id. ("The issuer, however, is not able to cheaply convey his information about his
own credit risk to the investor. Because he may profit from supplying the investor with
wrong information, investors will generally not trust the reliability of such information.").
25. Id. at 21.
26. Id.
27. See infra Part I.B.1.
28. See infra pp. 407-09 and note 67.
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a slow process that requires foregoing certain near-term profits for larger
but uncertain long-term profits. Rating agencies fearing an impending
market collapse, a regulatory crackdown, increased competition, or any
other factor that would diminish the prospect of future economic rents,
have less incentive to invest in reputation, and may even be induced to
jeopardize their reputations.
1. The Value of Regulatory Licenses
In 1975, the SEC created a new and powerful element of credit rating
value-the regulatory license.29 The SEC wanted to limit broker-dealer
holdings of risky debt. Sensing it lacked competence to assess risk itself,
the SEC delegated this function to credit rating agencies it trusted to
provide accurate and reliable assessments. The SEC termed these chosen
agencies Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations
(NRSROs). ° At first, the SEC used this designation only for the Net
Capital Rule, Rule 15c3-1 of the Investment Company Act, which
required broker-dealers to carry a specified minimum ratio of capital to
debt, but allowed a lower ratio when the debt in question was investment
grade, as determined by an NRSRO. 3 1 Rule 2a-7 of the Investment
Company Act, adopted later, limited money market funds to investing in
the two highest rating categories for short-term debt, again as rated by an
NRSRO.32 Rule 415 of the Securities Act and the related instructions for
forms S-3 and F-3 allowed issuers to register for the shelf primary
offerings of non-convertible securities if they carried an investment grade
rating from at least one NRSRO.33 Today, NRSRO ratings have been
incorporated into "hundreds of rules, releases, and regulatory decisions, in
various substantive areas including securities, pension, banking, real
estate, and insurance regulation." 34 The net effect of this regulatory web is
that "[a]lmost all regulated financial institutions-banks, insurance com-
29. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 109-326, at 4 (2006).
30. Id. at 1.
31. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (2009). Within the spectrum of ratings on long-term
obligations, ratings in the first four ratings categories are designated as "investment
grade," meaning that they are generally regarded as subject to no more than moderate
credit risk. See Moody's Rating Symbols & Definitions, supra note 22, at 11.
32. See S. REP. No. 109-326, at 4; SEC Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (2008).
33. See SEC Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (2008).
34. Partnoy, supra note 19, at 82; see also DrrrRIcH, supra note 20, at 16 ("By 2002
there were at least eight federal statutes and 47 federal regulations, along with over 100
state laws and regulations, [that] reference[d] NRSRO ratings as a benchmark.").
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panies, pension funds, etc.-must heed the NRSROs' ratings in deciding
which bonds they can hold in their portfolios."
35
Despite the volume of ratings-based regulation, nearly all fit into one
of three areas: "disclosure requirements, investment restrictions, [or]
capital requirements." 36 Turning to the three rules discussed above, the
Net Capital Rule is-as its name makes obvious-a capital requirement,
Rule 2a-7 is an investment restriction, and Rule 415 is a disclosure re-
quirement. This structure makes investment grade ratings from NRSROs
highly valuable to issuers, since capital requirements and investment
restrictions greatly expand the market of potential buyers for highly-rated
bonds while reduced disclosure requirements for highly-rated bonds lower
issuance costs.
37
It cannot be seriously disputed that these regulations produce great
value for NRSROs. But the first and dominant articulation of this view,
advanced by Frank Partnoy in his "highly influential ' 38 1999 article, goes
further and argues that the regulatory value of credit ratings dwarfs their
informational value.39 This implies that if issuers had to choose between
sending credible signals to investors with accurate, lower ratings and
reaching a large market of institutional investors with inflated, investment
35. Lawrence J. White, The Bond-Rating Game, STERNBUSlNESS, Fall/Winter 2005,
available at http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/stembusiness/fall-winter_2003/bondrating.html.
36. DIrrRICH, supra note 20, at 16.
In the first area, credit ratings serve to define disclosure requirements.
An appropriate credit rating may lower legislative obligations, or may
even be a path to completely avoid supervision. Ratings can also be a
requirement for issuing special financial products. The goal is to free
low-risk companies from unnecessary regulatory scrutiny. Secondly,
regulators use credit ratings to impose investment restrictions on certain
financial institutions. By prohibiting the holding of unrated or low-
rated investments, the riskiness of the overall portfolio can be limited.
The third category comprises all rules concerning capital requirements.
Private credit ratings are used in this context to determine the riskiness
of single assets and the appropriate capital needed to ensure against
default.
Id.
37. See Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets: The Role of the Credit Rating Agencies
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111 th Cong. 3 (2008)
[hereinafter Turmoil in Credit Markets] (statement of John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. Berle
Professor of Law, Columbia Law School) ("[E]ven if their views were not respected or
their ratings were known to be inflated, they would still be retained to grant 'regulatory
licenses."'), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/ files/OpgStmtCoffeeSenate
TestimonyTurmoilintheUSCreditMarkets.pdf; see also Partnoy, supra note 19, at 92.
38. S. REP. No. 109-326, at 7 n.21 (2006).
39. See Partnoy, supra note 19, at 81-89.
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grade ratings, they would choose the latter with ease. It follows that
issuers will principally seek the services of NRSROs not as reputed inter-
mediaries, but as regulatory licensors. As a result, agencies' incentives to
help issuers achieve their regulatory goals will displace their incentives to
maintain their reputation for producing accurate and reliable ratings, at
least where these interests conflict. Credit rating agencies will be concern-
ed first with receiving and retaining the coveted NRSRO designation,
second with maintaining their reputation among issuers for facilitating
regulatory compliance, and only third with maintaining their reputation
among investors for accuracy. Where these interests do not conflict,
NRSROs will act on all three incentives. Where they do conflict, as
around the investment grade barrier, NRSROs will act on the stronger
incentive.
Partnoy's position has its critics. Aside from the NRSROs, who claim
that their "continued reputation for objective and independent ratings is
essential" to their success,4 0 Partnoy has also encountered resistance in the
academic literature. While not arguing that regulatory licenses are mean-
ingless, some allege that Partnoy "overstates his case" and that regulatory
licenses cannot constitute all or even most of ratings' value. 4 1 The main
points in favor of this contention are that issuers almost always (1) pay for
non-investment grade ratings, (2) seek ratings from at least two NRSROs,
and (3) get at least one rating from one of the two most venerable
NRSROs.
42
Two of these points indicate that ratings contain some non-regulatory
value.43 Purchasing non-investment grade ratings does not provide favor-
able regulatory treatment. Therefore, issuers purchasing these ratings must
believe that they contain some non-regulatory value. Similarly, since
investment grade ratings contain the same regulatory value regardless of
which NRSRO issues them, choosing to pay more for a rating from a
prestigious NRSRO demonstrates that issuers value reputation."
40. Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Inquiry Looks for Conflicts in Credit Rating, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 27, 2007, at C4 (quoting The Role and Impact of Credit Rating Agencies on
the Subprime Credit Markets Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 111 th Cong. 12 (2007) [hereinafter Subprime Credit Markets Hearing] (statement
of Michael Kanef, Group Managing Director, Moody's Investors Services)).
41. See, e.g., Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 43,
65-66 (2004); see also DrrrRICH, supra note 20, at 72-73.
42. Hill, supra note 41, at 65-66.
43. Paying for two ratings has a regulatory explanation since some regulations
require at least two investment grade ratings. See id. at 66.
44. Issuers may also pay more as a means of signaling to investors their ability to pay
more, and therefore their financial health. Economists have theorized that this type of
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The problem with the critics' arguments is that issuers might act this
way even if regulatory value dominates. The existence of informational
value does not negate the dominance of regulatory value. It is quite poss-
ible, for example, that issuers pay for investment grade ratings because of
their superior regulatory value and for lower ratings because of their
residual informational value. The incentives simply do not conflict in
these situations. The above-cited behavior therefore fails to establish that
one or the other incentive is greater.
Prominent empirical studies support the conclusion that the regulatory
value of credit ratings exceeds their informational value. Two recent major
studies have analyzed rating behavior by NRSROs and non-NRSROs,
examining trends in their upgrading and downgrading decisions.
45
Together these studies have examined the timing of rating changes by (1)
comparing upgrades to downgrades to see whether agencies tended to act
in a more timely manner in one or the other situation, (2) comparing the
NRSRO rating changes to non-NRSRO rating changes to see whether the
regulatory power of NRSROs affects the speed of their decisions, and (3)
comparing NRSRO downgrades across the investment grade barrier to
other NRSRO downgrades to see whether the regulatory consequences of
the former reduce NRSRO willingness to maintain accurate ratings.46
Specifically, a joint study by the business schools of the University of
Michigan and Stanford University compared upgrades and downgrades of
non-NRSRO rating agency Egan Jones with those of NRSRO Moody's
and found that (1) Egan Jones upgraded and downgraded ratings in a more
timely manner than did Moody's; (2) Moody's, as compared to Egan
Jones, generally downgraded in a more timely manner than it upgraded;
and (3) Moody's lagged in downgrading at the investment grade cutoff
signaling explains massive advertising campaigns.
What, after all, is the information contained within a soft drink adver-
tisement? Coca-Cola. Real. Pardon? The only information that potential
customers can glean from such an advertisement is that it was
expensive to make, and that therefore the Coca-Cola Company plans to
stick around with the same commitment to high-quality products that it
always had.
TiM HARFORD, THE UNDERCOVER ECONOMIST 117 (2006).
45. RICHARD JOHNSON, FED. RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY, AN EXAMINATION OF
RATING AGENCIES' ACTIONS AROuND THE INVESTMENT-GRADE BOUNDARY (2003);
William H. Beaver, Catherine Shakespeare & Mark T. Soliman, Differential Properties
in the Ratings of Certified versus Non-certified Bond Rating Agencies, 42 J. ACCT. &
ECON. 303 (2006).
46. See reports cited supra note 45.
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more than it did for other downgrades. 47 A study by the Federal Reserve
Bank of Kansas City strengthened the third finding of the Stanford-
Michigan study.48 It examined downgrades from the lowest investment
grade rating for each of the largest three NRSROs-Moody's, S&P, and
Fitch-and found a tendency for large downgrades to begin from the
lowest investment grade.
49
Non-NRSROs are quicker than NRSROs to make rating changes,
suggesting that NRSROs are more concerned with serving the regulatory
interests of issuers than they are with serving the informational needs of
investors. Also, NRSROs delaying downgrades from the lowest invest-
ment grade or making larger downgrades from the lowest investment
grade could suggest-as the Stanford-Michigan study found-that
NRSROs require more evidence to downgrade across the investment grade
barrier than they do to make other rating changes. 50 Alternatively, it could
suggest-as the Federal Reserve Bank study concluded-that NRSROs
define their lowest investment grade broadly. Both of these possibilities
suggest that NRSROs base rating changes on regulatory value.
Furthermore, NRSROs generally upgrade faster than they downgrade
indicates that they are more concerned with their reputation where a
failure to act is likely to garner negative publicity with both investors and
regulators.
52
Moreover, the data supports the hierarchy of NRSRO incentives
described above.53 Non-NRSROs monitor and update ratings in a timelier
manner than do NRSROs, which makes sense if NRSROs are more con-
cerned with helping issuers comply with regulations than they are with
bolstering their reputations with investors. NRSROs are slower than non-
NRSROs to downgrade ratings across the investment grade barrier since
these downgrades harm NRSROs' reputation with issuers for maintaining
regulatory compliance.54 Apart from the investment grade barrier, how-
47. See Beaver, Shakespeare & Soliman, supra note 45, at 304-07.
48. See JOHNSON, supra note 45, at 1-3.
49. Id.
50. Beaver, Shakespeare & Soliman, supra note 45, at 304-07.
51. JOHNSON, supra note 45, at 2.
52. This finding does not distinguish between rating changes that implicate reg-
ulations and those that do not. Therefore it cannot be a basis to draw broad conclusions
about the relative informational and regulatory values of credit ratings. A more targeted
study would examine whether upgrades are faster than downgrades around the invest-
ment grade barrier.
53. See infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
54. While negative business effects are attendant to all corporate ratings downgrades
(making future debt more expensive to incur and existing debt more expensive to
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ever, NRSROs incorporate bad news into ratings faster than they incur-
porate good news. This is likely both because failure to incorporate bad
news will garner negative publicity, putting NRSROs at increased risk of
oversight, and because the reputation mechanism still functions when
regulations are not implicated.
2. Reputation-Building and the Balance of Short-Term and Long-Term
Profit Motives
Reputation-building activity is costly. It requires that an entity forego
certain short-term profit in return for expected long-term gain. Therefore,
where the prospect of long-term profit decreases or the prospect of short-
term profit increases, rating agencies have less incentive to invest in
reputation.55 Many factors can affect this balance. In the credit rating
industry these have recently included the rise and subsequent fall of
structured debt products, the continuing prospect of impending costly
regulation, and increased competition.
From 2000 until 2007, the growth of structured finance drove an
exponential increase in revenue for the major rating agencies. Moody's-
the only agency that is also a reporting company-had its net income rise
"from $159 million in 2000 to $425 million in 2004, while its stock price
increased by 300% between 2001 and 2006. "56 Over roughly the same
period, the share of Moody's revenue generated by structured finance rose
to 44 %.57
While profits were booming, rating agencies came under increased
scrutiny from Congress and the SEC. Efforts to reform the industry pro-
ceeded continuously from the 2001 collapse of Enron forward, focusing
restructure or refinance), downgrades from investment grade to speculative grade
magnify these effects. Such downgrades instantly bring issuers out of compliance with
regulations which, as described above, lowers demand and increases issuance costs.
Turmoil in Credit Markets, supra note 37, at 3 (statement of John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A.
Berle Professor of Law, Columbia Law School).
55. See, e.g., BECKER & MILBOURN, supra note 7, at 2 (finding that sellers will
produce high quality goods "when the value of expected future rents associated with a
maintained reputation exceeds the temporary profit gains from delivering lower quality
goods" (citing Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffer, The Role of Market Force in Assuring
Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981))).
56. See Turmoil in Credit Markets, supra note 37, at 7 (statement of John C. Coffee,
Jr., Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia Law School) (citing Partnoy, supra note
19, at 65-66).
57. Richard Beales, Saskia Scholtes & Gillian Tett, Failing Grades?: Why Regula-
tors Fear Credit Ratings may be out of their Depth, FIN. TIMES, May 16, 2007, at 8.
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on laws that would impose disclosure and investigatory compliance costs
on NRSROs. 58 Reform efforts also threatened increased competition,
which would decrease the oligopolistic rents that Moody's, S&P, and to a
certain extent, Fitch, had long enjoyed.59 Significantly, empirical research
has directly connected increased competition in the credit rating industry
to weakening of the reputation mechanism. A study from Harvard Busi-
ness School found that competition among credit rating agencies leads to
ratings of poorer quality for two reasons.% First, reputation-building only
makes sense if there are expected future rents. 61 Since competition tends to
reduce rents, the incentive to invest in reputation is similarly reduced.62
Second, pressure to maintain market share in a more highly competitive
setting may induce participants to attract business in the near term, again
at the expense of reputation-building activity.63 The study produced three
findings that support these hypotheses: (1) ratings issued by S&P rose as
competition increased; (2) the correlation between bond yields and ratings
decreased as competition increased; and (3) declines in equity~rices grew
larger in response to downgrades as competition increased. All three
findings supported the study's conclusion that "equilibrium ... in the
ratings industry relies on rents to reward reputation-building activities
which are costly in the short run[, and that the absence] of such rents
reduces the amount of reputation-building."
65
In addition, fear that fundamentally unsound financial products were
generating their fastest-growing source of revenue also caused rating
agencies to value their long-term profits less. Internal documents released
during the most recent House Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform hearing and related testimony show just this sort of internal
concern about the then soon-to-be imploding market for structured finance
products.66 Specifically, analysts at S&P were aware that the products they
58. S. REP. No. 109-326, at 1 (2006).
59. For a discussion of how Moody's and S&P especially have dominated the ind-
ustry, see infra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
60. BECKER & MILBOURN, supra note 7, at 4.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 3.
63. See id. at 2-3.
64. See id. at 16-22; see also id. at 20 (stating with respect to the second finding that
"[t]he magnitude of this effect is economically large").
65. See id. at 6. "[E]ncouraging competition may reduce monopolistic (or in the case
of ratings, oligopolistic) rents, but ... it is not likely to improve quality." Id. at 8.
66. Financial Crisis Hearing, supra note 7, at 4-6 (statement of Frank Raiter, former
executive, S&P).
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67were being asked to rate were far riskier than the model reflected, and
top executives had known for years that the model they were using failed
to reflect much of the risk in structured products, evidenced by the fact
that they had developed, but not implemented, a much more accurate
model.6 Bolstering this circumstantial evidence, insiders confirm that dur-
ing this period the major rating agencies shifted from a long-term reputa-
tional focus to a short-term revenue focus.69 In sum, these years presented
rating agencies with a combination of massive short-term profits from the
rise of structured finance and an expectation of greatly diminished long-
term profits due to both anticipated regulation and the anticipated collapse
of the very products that were generating their short-term wealth.7°
II. REFORM EFFORTS
The effort to reform the credit rating industry began in 2001 and 2002
with the collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and several other large, prominent
companies. 71 Investors suffered massive losses which they alleged occur-
red in part because credit rating agencies delayed downgrading many
issuers despite overwhelming evidence that they were at severe risk of
defaulting on their bond obligations. 72 The resulting political pressure
resulted in various studies, reports, hearings and concept releases focusing
on the oligopolistic nature of the NRSRO industry, the potential for
67. In the now infamous instant message between two S&P structured finance
analysts, the same analyst who said that a deal "could be structured by cows and we
would rate it" also acknowledged that S&P's "model deflinitely] does not capture half
the ris[k]." Instant Message Conversation between Shannon Mooney and Rahul Dilip
Shah (Apr. 5, 2007), available at http://www.footnoted.org/wp-contentluploads/2008/l0/
20081022112325.pdf.
68. Financial Crisis Hearing, supra note 7, at 2, 4-6 (statement of Frank Raiter,
former executive, S&P). Frank Raiter asserted that S&P did not adopt a model that would
more accurately reflect the risk in structured products because "improving the model
would not add to S&P's revenues." Id. at 6.
69. Id. at 8-9. Frank Raiter, former Managing Director and Head of Residential
Mortgage Backed Securities Ratings at S&P, observed that "[t]he three primary rating
agencies, Moody's, S&P and Fitch ... have concentrated on maximizing short-term profits
rather than maximizing longer term financial benefit from accuracy of their credit ratings
and surveillance reviews." Id. at 8-9. Raiter, however, sees this "complacency" as a result
of insufficient competition. Id. at 8. As will be shown in more detail in Part II.B,
competition will only lead to accuracy, if ever, in the presence of a properly functioning
reputation mechanism, one that compels agencies to compete to produce accurate ratings.
70. See id. at 2, 7-9.
71. S. REP. No. 109-326, at 1 (2006).
72. Id. at 8.
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conflicts of interest inherent in the NRSRO business model, and the lack
of transparency in the rating process. 73 As a result, Congress passed the
CRARA in the fall of 2006, which sought to improve rating quality
through increased competition, accountability, and transparency. 74 The
CRARA both left the rating agency business model intact and -proscribed
the SEC from regulating agency procedures and methodologies.
In September 2007, just a year after passing legislation intended to
improve the accuracy of credit ratings, Congress held hearings on the role
of credit rating agencies in the collapse of the subprime securities
76market. While unsurprising in light of widespread investor complaints
that credit rating agencies delayed downgrading debt at heightened risk of
default, these hearings were exceptional in addressing the adequacy of a
thoroughly considered, but newly adopted, statute. The hearings focused
on issues familiar to the previous reform efforts, paying special attention
to the issuer-pays conflict. 77 In the spring, reformers found new areas of
concern. 78 Three studies-all of which the SEC participated in-found
that flawed methodologies and undue investor reliance on NRSRO ratings
contributed to agencies selling low quality ratings.79 The Senate Com-
mittee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs held a hearing in April
2008 on the role of the rating agencies in the collapse of the U.S. credit
market that also identified these problems.
80
73. See id. at 2, 4-8.
74. Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, § 4, 120 Stat.
1327, 1329, 1334 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see also S.
REP. No. 109-326, at 2.
75. Credit Rating Agency Reform Act § 4, 120 Stat. at 1327, 1329, 1334.
76. See The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in the Structured Finance Market:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Ins., and Gov't Sponsored Enters. of
the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 1, 4 (2007) [hereinafter Structured Finance
Market Hearing]; Subprime Credit Markets Hearing, supra note 40, at 1-3.
77. See Structured Finance Market Hearing, supra note 76, at 16-17; Subprime
Credit Markets Hearing, supra note 40, at 1, 15 (statement of John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf
A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia Law School); id. at 10 (statement of Michael
Kanef, Group Managing Director, Moody's Investors Service).
78. See Turmoil in Credit Markets, supra note 37, at 1, 6 (statement of Christopher
Cox, Chairman, SEC); id. at 3-4 (statement of John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. Berle
Professor of Law, Columbia Law School).
79. See id. at 1, 6 (statement of John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law,
Columbia Law School).
80. See id. at 1, 6 (statement of Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC); id. at 3-4
(statement of John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia Law
School).
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Subsequent SEC rulemaking proposals addressed structured finance-
specific problems through the SEC's power under the CRARA to improve
agency accountability and transparency. In addition, the SEC sought to
decrease investor reliance on NRSRO ratings by removing references to
NRSROs in various SEC rules and regulations, relying on authority
granted under the CRARA82 but left unexercised under the SEC's 2007
rulemaking initiatives. Despite the findings in reports it helped to create,
the SEC did not directly address failings in agency procedures and
methodologies, as the CRARA expressly blocked that path.83 In the face
of broad opposition, the SEC dropped its second proposal and adopted
only modest amendments to existing rules under its first proposal.
84
Congress, meanwhile, took no legislative action, leaving reform of the
credit rating industry to the incoming administration.
This Part describes these developments in some detail and argues that
if the arguments made in Part I are correct, improving transparency and
competition are the wrong means to achieve rating accuracy around the
critical investment grade barrier. In addition, while in theory account-
ability could reduce some causes of inaccuracy, the CRARA defers to the
NRSRO business model and limits its reach to specific acts and practices
instead of addressing the systemic causes of inaccuracy. This Part further
finds that failings in the reputation mechanism can and have caused
agencies to intentionally adopt procedures and methodologies that produce
inaccurate ratings, hiding poor quality in the one area Congress forbade
the SEC from regulating.
81. Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, § 4, 120 Stat.
1327, 1331-34 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Proposed Rules
for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Exchange Act Release No.
57,967, 73 Fed. Reg. 36,212 (June 25, 2008) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249b).
82. Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 73 Fed. Reg. at 36,213;
see also Testimony Concerning "Reforming Credit Rating Agencies": Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Ins., and Gov't Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on
Fin. Servs., 111 th Cong. (2009) (statement of Daniel M. Gallagher, Co-Acting Director,
Division of Trading and Markets, SEC), available at http://sec.gov/news/testimony/2009/
ts093009dmg.htm; Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, Opening Statement Before the
SEC Open Meeting (Sept. 17, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/
spch09l7O9mls-nrsros.htm.
83. Credit Rating Agency Reform Act § 4, 120 Stat. at 1329, 1332.
84. Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization, 73 Fed. Reg. at 36,212.
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A. From Enron to the CRARA: 2001-2006
1. The Need to Reform the Credit Rating Agencies
The widespread failure of NRSROs to downgrade corporate bond
issuers in 2001 and 2002 has been well documented. Most dramatically,
the NRSROs rated Enron as investment grade until four days before its
bankruptcy.86 Almost as stunning were defaults by WorldCom, Global
Crossing, AT&T Canada, and the California utilities, weeks to months
after having investment grade ratings.87 Dilatory downgrades allowed
money markets, pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, and
other financial institutions to remain invested in risky positions where
applicable ratings-based regulations would have required them to divest.
88
Other investors lost money by directly relying on inaccurate ratings.89 The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 responded to these failings by requiring the
SEC to produce a report addressing, among other things, the lack of
competition among NRSROs, the potential for abuse inherent in the
NRSRO business model, and the need for increased disclosure about
ratings decisions. 90 At the same time, academic interest in credit rating
agencies spiked.91
Before the SEC instituted a new application procedure under the
CRARA, it had recognized seven rating agencies as NRSROs. 92 Of these,
Moody's and S&P held 80% of the market share by revenue.93 In addition,
Moody's and S&P together rated over 99% of all debt issues in the United
States.94 Most agreed that the NRSRO application process directly caused
85. See, e.g., Comment Letter of Egan-Jones Ratings Company 1 (Nov. 10, 2002),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/extra/credrate/eganjones2.htm.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See supra Part I.B.1 (explaining the link between investment restrictions and
NRSRO credit ratings).
89. See Turmoil in Credit Markets, supra note 37, at 3-4 (statement of John C.
Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia Law School).
90. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 702, 116 Stat. 745, 797-98;
SEC, REPORT ON THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN THE
OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS 1-2 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 SEC REPORT].
91. For example, the first versions of both of the studies discussed in Part I.B were
published in 2003.
92. See Press Release, SEC, Credit Rating Agencies Apply for Registration as Nati-
onally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (June 28, 2007), available at
http:llwww.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-124.htm.
93. S. REP. No. 109-326, at 4 (2006).
94. Id.
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this extreme market concentration.95 NRSRO designation depended on
many factors, the most important of which was whether the agency was
"nationally recognized" as determined by the SEC.96 The Department of
Justice believed the national recognition requirement created a "nearly
insurmountable barrier to new entry into the market for NRSRO
services;" 97 the Senate Report on the CRARA described the system as
presenting an "obvious 'Catch 22. ' ' '98 In short, the NRSRO designation
provided guaranteed demand for rating services, while the designation
process effectively excluded other players.
Within this environment, NRSROs developed a business model
focused on issuer service.99 Since the 1970s, major rating agencies have
operated under an issuer-pays fee model, abandoning their earlier investor-
pays subscription fee model.1°° Issuer fees now constitute upward of 90%
of NRSRO revenue, 10 1 which represents fees from both ratings and
ancillary, consulting-type services. 10 2 The remaining NRSRO revenue
comes from subscription fees issuers pay for access to full rating
reports. 10 3 A review of ancillary services reveals several potential con-
flicts:
[C]redit rating agencies market pre-rating assessments and corporate
consulting. For an additional fee, issuers present hypothetical scenarios
to the rating agencies to understand how a particular transaction ...
might affect their ratings....
In addition, Moody's, S&P, and Fitch each offer risk management
consulting services. According to the SEC, the products and services
offered include "public and private firm credit scoring models, internal
95. See id. at 5-7.
96. 2003 SEC REPORT, supra note 90, at 9.
97. Id. at 37 (quoting Comments of the U.S. Dept. of Justice in the Matter of: File
No. S7-33-97 Proposed Amendments to Rule 15c3-1 under the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934 (Mar. 6, 1998)).
98. S. REP. No. 109-326, at 6 ("[T]o get the designation you must be nationally
recognized, but you cannot become nationally recognized without first having the design-
nation.").
99. 2003 SEC REPORT, supra note 90, at 41.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See id. at 42-43. Moody's asserts that its pre-rating assessment service is an
"integral element of the rating process," Moody's Investors Service, Moody's Investors
Service Ratings Policy: Policy with Respect to Non-Rating Services, n.2, http://www.
moodys.com/non rating-service-policy (last visited Mar. 13, 2010), and therefore does
not subject this service to its conflicts management policy for ancillary services. Id. at 1.
103. 2003 SEC REPORT, supra note 90, at 41 n. 110.
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ratings systems services, and empirical data on default incidence, loss
severity, default correlations, and rating transitions."
' '1 4
The SEC believed these services "exacerbated" the conflict of an
issuer-pays system. 10 5 In pre-rating assessments, an NRSRO might pro-
mise a particular rating and then feel bound to adhere to its preliminary
decision during the actual rating process. 1 6 Similarly, NRSROs could bait
issuers into purchasing other consulting services with the carrot of a favor-
able rating. 1°7 Ancillary services provided additional opportunities for
issuers to unduly influence NRSRO ratings.
10 8
Finally, investors criticized NRSROs for their opaque rating proc-
esses. 1° 9 Ratings incorporated both publicly available information and
information issuers selectively disclosed during the rating process.
11°
NRSROs excluded all but paying subscribers from the rating decision
reasoning, and even these few could not tell how the NRSROs weighed
different factors. 1' Without adequate transparency, investors argued that
they would be unable to adequately "judge [the] credibility and reliability"
of ratings when making investment decisions.
z"2
2. The Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006
The Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 (CRARA or the Act)
is, as stated by its informative long title, an Act to "improve ratings quality
for the protection of investors and in the public interest by fostering
accountability, transparency, and competition in the credit rating agency
industry."113 The Act functions by replacing the anti-competitive NRSRO
designation standards with an application process that conditions SEC
registration as an NRSRO on an agency's disclosure of specified infor-
mation and its adoption and enforcement of policies to manage potential
conflicts of interest and abusive practices. 114 In addition, the agency must
have been in the business of producing credit ratings for at least three
104. Partnoy, supra note 19, at 70.
105. Id.
106. id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See 2003 SEC REPORT, supra note 90, at 33.
110. Id. at 26.
111. Seeid. at 33-44.
112. Id. at36.
113. Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
114. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (2008).
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consecutive years immediately preceding the date of application and must
"maintain adequate financial and managerial resources to consistently
produce credit ratings with integrity." ' 15 Within the section covering the
registration of NRSROs, the Act also gives the SEC the authority to
amend or revise rules and regulations that reference NRSROs "as are
required by [the Act] or are otherwise necessary to carry out this
section."" 6 The CRARA further requires that the SEC adopt rules
supplementing Congress' requirements, but proscribes the SEC from
"regulat[ing] the substance of credit ratings or the procedures and
methodologies by which any nationally recognized statistical rating organ-
ization determines credit ratings." ' 17 The SEC's rules and regulations must
also be "narrowly tailored" to the requirements of the Act.'
18
Applicants must disclose, among other things, performance measure-
ment statistics, procedures, and methodologies used in determining
ratings, conflicts of interest, and, on a confidential basis, a list of the
twenty largest issuers and subscribers, by net revenue, that use the credit
rating services.1 19 The SEC's final rules, adopted in June of 2007, require
NRSROs to make and retain detailed financials, records of past ratings and
ancillary service activity, internal records, nonpublic work papers, and
various other documents. 12 The mix of public and nonpublic information
makes it clear that disclosures and record-keeping requirements are meant
to serve the dual purposes of increasing transparency to investors and
facilitating accountability.
SEC oversight under the CRARA focuses on two things: whether
NRSROs are adhering to their disclosed rating procedures and meth-
odologies and whether they are following the Act's conflicts-management
provisions. 12 1 Specifically, NRSROs must "establish, maintain, and en-
force written policies and procedures reasonably designed, taking into
consideration the nature of the business of such [NRSRO] ... to address
and manage any conflicts of interest that can arise from such business."
'1 22
SEC rules prohibit a few particularly blatant conflicts, but allow disclosure
115. Id. §§ 78o-7(a)(1)(C)(iv)(H), 78o-7(d)(5).
116. Id. § 78o-7(n)(1).
117. Id. § 78o-7(c).
118. Id.
119. See id. § 78o-7(a)(1)(B).
120. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-2 (2009).
121. See Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, § 4, 120
Stat. 1327, 1329, 1334 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
122. 15 U.S.C. §78o-7(h)(1).
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and management of. all conflicts common to the credit rating agency
business model.
123
3. The Collapse of Structured Debt and Subsequent Reform Efforts
While corporate bond defaults spurred the reform efforts leading to the
CRARA, downgrades of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) have
driven those efforts since. 124 In the summer of 2007, just as the SEC
adopted final rules in furtherance of the CRARA, major credit agencies
were rapidly accelerating their downgrades on a range of structured debt
products. 125 Moody's alone downgraded over 5,000 mortgage-backed
securities through the end of 2007. 26 Bloomberg reported that the three
largest NRSROs "began cutting in July [2007] and have since either
downgraded or put on review a total of 38,000 subprime bonds....
Moody's and S&P combined have downgraded more than 9,513 of the
123. For instance, NRSROs may not receive ten percent or more of their revenue from
a single issuer or have a director in common with an issuer. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(c)(1)
(2007). The first of these is especially irrelevant to the current NRSROs since NRSROs
have long disclosed that even their largest clients provide little more than one percent of
their revenue. 2003 SEC REPORT, supra note 90, at 23 n.62. As for the conflicts common
to the NRSRO business model, the SEC stated:
These are the types of conflicts that commonly arise from the business
of providing credit rating services. Prohibiting these types of conflicts
outright may adversely impact the ability of an NRSRO to operate as a
credit rating agency. Nonetheless, the conflicts must be managed
through policies and procedures and disclosed so that users of the credit
ratings can assess whether the conflict impacts the NRSRO's judgment.
Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies, Exchange Act Release No. 55,957, 72 Fed. Reg.
33,564, 33,595 (June 18, 2007) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249b).
124. See Turmoil in Credit Markets, supra note 37, at 4-5 (statement of John C.
Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia Law School).
125. Id. at 8 ("[M]ajor downgrades did not come until July 2007, when S&P
downgraded some $7.3 billion of CDO securities sold in 2005 and 2006. Shortly
thereafter, Moody's downgraded some 691 issues from 2006, with an original value of
$19.4 billion, including some 78 bonds which Moody's had originally rated AAA."); FIN.
STABILITY FORUM, REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL STABILrrY FORUM ON ENHANCING
MARKET AND INSTITUTIONAL RESILIENCE 32 (2008) [hereinafter FSF REPORT] ("[S]ince
mid-2007 CRAs have announced an inordinate number of multiple notch downgrades of
these instruments."); Labaton, supra note 40 ("In recent months, the agencies have
quickly, though critics say belatedly, downgraded hundreds of mortgage-bond ratings.").
126. Roger Lowenstein, Triple-A Failure, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 27, 2008, availa-
ble at http://www.nytimes.comI2008/04/27/magazine/27Credit-t.html?pagewanted ("Last
year, Moody's had to downgrade more than 5,000 mortgage securities-a tacit
acknowledgment that the mortgage bubble was abetted by its overly generous ratings.").
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,,127
securities dating from 2005. These actions, combined with the
deepening credit crisis, prompted a second cycle of hearings, reports, and
rule proposals. 
1 28
In September 2007, both the Senate Banking Committee and the
Capital Markets Subcommittee of the House Financial Services Com-
mittee held hearings, bringing renewed scrutiny to both conflicts in the
issuer-pays business model and the opacity of agency procedures and
products. 129 The following spring, three reports brought attention to two
problems unaddressed in the reform efforts leading to the CRARA: failed
rating agency models and undue investor reliance on NRSRO credit
ratings. 130 The reports were issued from the President's Working Group on
Financial Markets (PWG), the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), and the
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). 13 1 The
SEC contributed to all three reports as a member agency of each group.
132
The PWG report found that the complexity of asset-backed securities
overwhelmed the rating agencies, leading to flawed methodologies. 133 The
FSF report also blamed poor credit assessments on flawed models, but did
127. Pittman, supra note 7.
128. See, e.g., Structured Finance Market Hearing, supra note 76; Labaton, supra
note 40.
129. See Structured Finance Market Hearing, supra note 76; Labaton, supra note 40.
Senator Menedez (D. N.J.) accused rating agencies of "playing both coach and referee."
Labaton, supra note 40. Senator Shelby (R. Ala.) complained that issuers, rather than
investors, paid agency fees. Id. "Some of the policy options that we could consider
include requiring more disclosures for rating agencies like those required of auditors."
Structured Finance Market Hearing, supra note 76, at 3 (opening statement of Paul E.
Kanjorski, Chairman, Subcomm. on Capital Markets). Executives from both S&P and
Moody's, as they had in the past, denied that the conflict had caused inaccurate ratings.
Id. at 14-16. Vickie Tillman, then Executive Vice President for Credit Market Services at
S&P's, defended the rating agency business model. Id. at 15-16. "Some have questioned
whether the 'issuer-pays' model has led S&P and others to issue higher, or less rigorously
analyzed, ratings so as to garner more business. There is no evidence-none at all-to
support that contention with respect to S&P." Labaton, supra note 40. Michael Kanef,
Group Managing Director of Moody's Asset Finance Group similarly defended Moody's
business model. Structured Finance Market Hearing, supra note 76, at 14-15. "Kanef ...
said his company likewise had no conflicts of interest that led to inflated ratings." Id.
130. See TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'NS, FINAL REPORT ON
THE ROLE OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN STRUCTURED FINANCE MARKETS (2008)
[hereinafter IOSCO REPORT]; FSF REPORT, supra note 125; THE PRESIDENT'S WORKING
GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, POLICY STATEMENT ON FINANCIAL MARKET
DEVELOPMENTS (2008) [hereinafter PWG REPORT].
131. See reports cited supra note 130.
132. Id.
133. See PWG REPORT, supra note 130, at 1-2, 9, 15.
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so without attributing the failings to rating agency incompetence. 134 In
addition, the FSF report found that official recognition in ratings policies
had caused investors to unduly rely on credit ratings. 135 The IOSCO report
supported this finding, concluding that the regulatory use of credit ratings
gave NRSRO credit ratings a governmental "seal of approval."' 136 In a
contemporaneous Senate hearing, ranking committee members Senators
Shelby and Dodd also identified flaws in agency models and cited investor
over-reliance on ratings as a major problem.
137
During this period, the SEC was preparing for a second round of
rulemaking under the CRARA. 138 Chairman Christopher Cox discussed
the Commission's ongoing efforts in his prepared statement at the April
2008 Senate hearing. 39 He noted that the staff was "observing that the
ratings process used to rate these [structured] products may have been less
quantitatively developed." 140 However, Cox urged Congress not to require
the SEC to "engage in substantive regulation" of procedures and method-
ogies as it would be "antithetical to the Commission's traditional disclo-
sure-based mission., 141 In drafting new rules, the SEC therefore focused
on the CRARA's "important objectives" of accountability, transparency,
and competition. 42 In addition to disclosure and conflict management
134. FSF REPORT, supra note 125, at 32-33. "The severe underestimation by CRAs of
the credit risks of instruments collateralised by subprime mortgages resulted in part from
flaws in their rating methodologies." Id. at 33. "Poor credit assessments by CRAs con-
tributed both to the build up to and the unfolding of recent events. In particular, CRAs
assigned high ratings to complex structured subprime debt based on inadequate historical
data and in some cases flawed models." Id. at 32.
135. Id. at 38 ("Such official recognition in regulation and/or supervisory policies may
have played a role in encouraging investors' over-reliance on ratings, by discouraging
some investors from paying close attention to what the ratings actually mean."); see also
id. at 37 ("[Sjome institutional investors have relied too heavily on ratings in their invest-
ment guidelines and choices, in some cases fully substituting ratings for independent risk
assessment and due diligence.").
136. IOSCO REPORT, supra note 130, at 8.
137. See Turmoil in Credit Markets, supra note 37, at 1 (statement of Richard C.
Shelby, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs), available
at http://banking.senate.gov/publiclfiles/ShelbyCreditRatingAgencies42208.pdf ("It se-
ems that the rating agencies grossly underestimated the risks associated with these
securities."); id. at 2 (statement of Christopher Dodd, Chairman, S. Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs).
138. See id. (statement of Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC).
139. See id.
140. Id. at 3.
141. Id.
142. See Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat.
1327 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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rules largely tailored to structured finance, the SEC exercised its previous-
ly unused authority to reconsider its "extensive reliance on, and reference
to, NRSRO credit ratings in its own rules." 143 The SEC believed this
change would promote competition by persuading market participants to
conduct their own diligence, thus becoming more discerning consumers of
credit ratings who would demand higher quality from their rating
agencies.
144
The SEC followed the Chairman's outline with two rulemaking
initiatives in June and July of 2008. The first sought to "address concerns
about the integrity of ... credit rating procedures and methodologies"
through enhanced disclosure requirements pertaining to credit rating
performance statistics, structured finance products, procedures and meth-
odologies, and conflict management rules specific to structured finance
products. 145 The second initiative sought to reduce "undue reliance" on
NRSRO ratings by removing the term from various Commission rules and
forms. 14 6 In all, the second initiative sought to increase competition by
removing NRSRO references from over fifteen rules, nine forms, four line
items, and one schedule under a total of four statutes. 147 Among these
were proposed amendments to the Net Capital Rule, Rule 2a-7, and Rule
415.148 The proposed rules would have amended Rule 2a-7 to rely solely
143. Tunnoil in Credit Markets, supra note 37, at 3, 8 (statement of Christopher Cox,
Chairman, SEC).
144. Id. at 8 ("Investors would use NRSRO ratings that they deemed to be credible,
along with other information, in conducting their due diligence. This could induce greater
competition among rating agencies to produce the highest quality, most reliable
ratings."). The SEC's June 2008 report required under the CRARA further clarifies the
rationale behind this part of the reform effort. "Finally, the Commission could reduce the
artificial barriers to competition and ratings quality by removing from its rules references
to NRSRO ratings, which effectively grant a regulatory 'seal of approval' to NRSROs."
SEC, ANNUAL REPORT ON NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED STATISTICAL RATING ORGAN-
IZATIONS 41 (2008).
145. Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations,
Exchange Act Release No. 57,967, 73 Fed. Reg. 36,212 (June 25, 2008) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249b).
146. See References to Ratings of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organi-
zations, Exchange Act Release No. 58,070, 73 Fed. Reg. 40,088 (proposed July 11, 2008)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242, 249); Security Ratings, Securities Act Release
No. 8940, Exchange Act Release No. 58,071, 73 Fed. Reg. 40,106 (proposed July 11,
2008) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 230, 239, 240); References to Ratings of
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Investment Company Act
Release No. 28,327, 73 Fed. Reg. 40,124 (proposed July 11, 2008) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 240, 242, 249).
147. See generally sources cited supra note 146.
148. References to Ratings, Investment Company Act Release No. 28,327, 73 Fed.
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on money market fund boards of directors to determine that a portfolio
investment presents minimal credit risks, eliminating a holding permission
based on NRSRO ratings.149 Similarly, the amendment to Rule 415 would
have disallowed previously acceptable shelf offerings for certain invest-
ment grade securities, replacing credit ratings with issuer quality cri-
teria. 15 Finally, the proposal would amend the Net Capital Rule, Rule
15c3-1, to no longer allow a more lenient ratio of debt to capital when the
debt is rated "in one of the three highest rating categories by at least two
NRSROs," instead using a requirement that the instrument be subject to a
minimal amount of credit risk and have sufficient liquidity such that it can
be sold at or near its carrying value almost immediately.15'
Comment letter reaction to the SEC's NRSRO-related rulemaking
proposals was largely ambivalent to the first rulemaking initiative but
strongly opposed to the second.152 The most strenuous objections attacked
the proposed amendments to the money market investment guidelines and
the shelf registration issue qualifications.' 53 Law firms attacked the
proposed shelf issuance restrictions, which they feared would adversely
affect deal volume, calling the measure "an over-reaction ' ' 54 that would
prevent quality debt issuances "for no reason."'155 Money market funds
voiced strong opposition to amending Rule 2a-7, ostensibly supporting the
existing NRSRO reference as a beneficial investor-protective measure that
provided an important "floor,' ' 56 "minimum standard,"'15 7 and "independ-
ently established baseline"'158 for investment risk. Two Prudential money
Reg. at 40,125-26.
149. Id.
150. Security Ratings, 73 Fed. Reg. at 40,108 to 40,109.
151. References to Ratings, Exchange Act Release No. 58,070, 73 Fed. Reg. at 40,092.
152. See generally SEC, Comments on References to Ratings of the Nationally Recog-
nized Statistical Rating Organizations, http://www.sec.gov/conmments/s7-19-08/s71908.
shtml (last visited Mar. 13, 2010).
153. Id.
154. Comment Letter of Mayer Brown LLP 2 (Sept. 4, 2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-19-08/s71908-19.pdf.
155. Comment Letter of Cleary Gottlieb LLP 1, 2 (Sept. 5, 2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7- 19-08/s71908-58.pdf.
156. Comment Letter of David Oestricher, Chief Legal Counsel & Darrell N. Braman,
Associate Legal Counsel, T. Rowe Price 2 (Sept. 5, 2008), available at http://www.sec.
gov/comments/s7-19-08/s71908 -39.pdf.
157. Comment Letter of Independent Trustees of ING Funds Trust and ING Investors
Trust 2 (Sept. 12, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-19-08/s71908-
61.pdf.
158. Comment Letter of The Vanguard Group, Inc. 2 (Aug. 1, 2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-19-08/s71908-1.pdf.
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market fund boards of directors were incredulous that the SEC believed
fund directors had "the necessary expertise" to evaluate the risk of
portfolio investments.
1 59
Aside from specific market participants protecting their particular
interests, there were two broader objections. Commenters from multiple
industries cautioned that the ongoing economic crisis counseled against
changes that could impose additional barriers to capital formation. Even
more prevalent were facial attacks to the major premise underlying the
proposals-that references to NRSROs caused undue investor reliance on
NRSRO ratings. Entities raising this point included ASF, a credit rating
agency industry body;160 Cleary Gottlieb 16 1 and Dechert, 162 law firms; and
the ABA's Section of Business Law. 163 In the face of this resistance, the
SEC abandoned its second rulemaking initiative. 164
159 Comment Letter of Prudential Series Fund and Prudential Gibraltar Fund, Inc. 1-
3 (Aug. 14, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-19-08/s71908-6.pdf.
160. Comment Letter of The American Securitization Forum 2-3 (Sept. 5, 2008),
available at http://www.americansecuritization.com/uploadedFiles/ASFFinalSEC_
CRALetter 9_5_08.pdf.
161. Comment Letter of Cleary Gottlieb, supra note 155.
162. Comment Letter of Dechert LLP 2 (Sept. 5, 2008), available at http://www.sec.
gov/comments/s7-19-08/s71908-41.pdf.
163. Comment Letter of the Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities of the
Section of Business Law of the American Bar Association 3 (Oct. 10, 2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-19-08/s71808-36.pdf.
164. See Kara Scannell, SEC Looks to Limit Rating-Firm Conflicts, WALL ST. J., Nov.
13, 2008, at C2 ('The Securities and Exchange Commission is expected to vote for rules
next week aimed at limiting conflicts of interest at credit rating firms, but it isn't expected
to adopt more substantial changes for the time being.").
The SEC isn't expected to take up two other rules proposed earlier this
year. One would reduce companies' and mutual funds' reliance on
credit ratings, which are embedded in SEC rules. Another idea is to
distinguish ratings for structured products from those given to corporate
bonds. Both ideas met with strong opposition from industry.
Id. On December 3, 2008, the SEC announced that it was considering whether to adopt
final rules from some proposals in its first initiative. See SEC, Final Rules and Proposed
Rules Relating to Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations and Credit
Ratings, Dec, 3. 2008, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/nrsrofactsheet-
120308.htm.
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B. Assessing the CRARA
1. Whether the CRARA Achieves Competition, Transparency, and
Accountability
The CRARA will likely allow more agencies to receive the NRSRO
designation, thereby increasing competition in the credit rating industry.
The new barriers to entry, while substantial, are relatively definite and
depend on an objective assessment of the applying agency's resources
instead of the subjective criteria of how users of ratings perceive the
agency. Since the inception of the CRARA, the SEC has recognized four
new NRSROs not recognized under the previous application process. On
its face, the Act seems to provide greater access to NRSRO status, and to
date the number of market participants has increased significantly. It
remains to be seen what effect this will have on the oligopolistic market
share enjoyed by Moody's, S&P, and, to a lesser extent, Fitch.
Since the SEC has already certified eleven NRSROs on the basis of
their applications, the contents of disclosures and policies deemed suff-
icient under the CRARA shed light on whether the Act is likely to achieve
transparency and accountability. 16 5 Transparency both allows investors to
develop informed opinions and facilitates accountability. This Section
addresses each function in turn. Based on the information in Moody's
application, the Act's disclosure requirements will allow investors to
assess the accuracy of an NRSRO's past ratings, but will do little to
elucidate either Moody's decision making process or its rating method-
ology. Currently available disclosures of past performance provide default
rates of different asset classes over short-, mid-, and long-term time
frames. 166 This information provides a basis for investors to deter-mine
whether a particular NRSRO deserves their trust and provides a basis for
comparison between NRSROs. On the other hand, the disclosures provide
little insight as to how Moody's makes particular ratings decisions or how
it decides to monitor or reevaluate a rating. Moody's lists many "quail-
tative and quantitative" factors that it typically considers, but notes that the
165. This Article uses information provided by Moody's NRSRO application. To the
extent that the SEC approved applications that contained less information than Moody's,
the requirements of the CRARA may be lower than represented in this discussion.
166. Moody's Investors Service, Form NRSRO Application, Exhibit 1, (June 26,
2007), available at http://www.moodys.comcust/content/content.ashx?source=static
content/Free%20Pages/Regulatory%20Affairs/Documents/nrsroapplication.pdf (last vis-
ited Mar. 13, 2010).
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list is neither "mandatory" nor "exhaustive."' 167 As for ensuring that ra-
tings are current, Moody's provides simply that it "will monitor the credit
rating, as deemed appropriate."'168 Therefore, NRSRO disclosure under the
CRARA will serve as a useful means to evaluate past performance, but
will not allow investors to assess the accuracy of any specific present
rating.
The continued opacity of rating agency decisions also informs a
discussion of accountability. Since the Act only requires NRSROs to abide
by the procedures and methodologies it says it will use and proscribes the
SEC from regulating an agency's procedures or methodologies, NRSROs
can effectively avoid oversight by maintaining sufficiently abstract rating
and monitoring criteria. By allowing itself to consider any factor, but not
requiring consideration of any factor, Moody's has given itself room to
justify any rating decision. What is more, Moody's retains complete
discretion to monitor or not monitor its ratings, and the SEC is powerless
to require more.
As was known well before the passage of the CRARA, NRSROs
maintain detailed conflict management procedures that require reporting
up, removing conflicted analysts from rating committees, and separating
compensation from rating decisions. 169 The Act will likely allow the SEC
to oversee and enforce these policies. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that
Moody's conflict management policies do recite some particularly
toothless language. For example, Moody's asserts that it "will not forbear
or refrain from taking a Credit Rating action based on the potential
[economic] effect ... of the action" and that the determination of a credit
rating "will be influenced only by factors relevant to the credit
assessment."' 170 Given Moody's opaque rating methodologies, transgr-
essions from these assurances will likely be difficult to discover through
SEC investigation. In addition, information made public through NRSRO
registration provides only a partial picture of the SEC's enforcement tools,
as NRSROs retain and disclose large amounts of information on a
confidential basis.
167. Id. at Exhibit 2, 6.
168. Id. at 4.
169. See Increased SEC Scrutiny of NRSROs and SEC Report Leads to New Rule
Proposals Intended to Increase Accountability, Transparency, and Competition in the
Industry, DECHERT ON POINT, July 2008, at 2.
170. Moody's Investors Service, Code of Professional Conduct, available at
http://www.moodys.com/professionalconduct (last visited Mar. 13, 2009).
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2. Whether the CRARA Can Produce Accurate Ratings
Despite partial success in achieving competition, transparency, and
accountability, these means must produce accurate ratings for the Act to
succeed. This Section asserts that competition, accountability, and trans-
parency will lead to accuracy only if NRSROs are more concerned with
preserving their reputation for accuracy than they are with serving issuers'
regulatory need for investment grade ratings. If, on the other hand, the
regulatory value of ratings dominates their informational value or the
reputation mechanism otherwise fails, the Act will do little to promote
rating accuracy. Compounding this difficulty, the need for expected future
rents to drive reputation-building activity makes the CRARA's com-
petition-promoting provisions particularly counterproductive.
Competition among NRSROs will promote accuracy only to the extent
their clients, the issuers, demand accuracy. If issuers are more concerned
with receiving and retaining investment grade ratings than they are with
maintaining their reputations with investors, agencies will simply not
compete to provide their clients with accurate ratings near that cutoff.
Similarly, transparency will lead to accurate ratings only if rating agencies
compete to produce accurate ratings. Increased disclosure will doubtlessly
allow investors to correctly assess the relative accuracy or inaccuracy of
NRSRO ratings. Investors will therefore be able to decide which agency
deserves their trust, but to the extent issuers choose the agency that will
best serve their regulatory needs, a decline in a rating agency's reputation
for accuracy will not force a change in behavior. Furthermore, it is actual
accuracy, and not the mere ability to detect inaccuracy, that is imperative
to the wisdom of the NRSRO framework. While investors actively
involved in assessing the risk of their investments may turn to other
sources of information in the face of unreliable ratings, those invested
passively in mutual funds or pension funds depend on rules that require
fund managers to sell off debt obligations when the risk of default
becomes too high. If the applicable NRSRO rating fails to reflect the
actual risk of default, fund managers may stay invested, subjecting invest-
ors to undue risk and defeating the objective of the applicable investor-
protective regulation. Competition also undermines accuracy for the
reasons stated in the Harvard Business School study.17 1 More market
participants create a greater supply of NRSRO rating services, which
drives down profits, which reduces a rating agency's incentive to invest in
171. See generally BECKER & MILBOURN, supra note 7.
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reputation. As a result, rating agencies will focus on maximizing short-
term profits at the expense of ratings quality.
Accountability for the purposes of the CRARA means producing
ratings using the procedures and methodologies that an NRSRO says it
will use and managing the conflicts of interest it is required to manage.
Plainly, holding an agency to follow its own rating procedures and
methodologies will not produce accuracy unless the procedures and
methodologies themselves would produce accuracy. Two of the studies
described in Part I, however, suggest that NRSROs may use method-
ologies that reflect a bias against downgrading near the investment grade
barrier. First, the Stanford-Michigan study interpreted its findings to mean
that certified rating agencies required more evidence to support a rating
downgrade from investment grade to non-investment grade than it did to
make other rating changes. 172 Second, the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas
City study found that S&P, Moody's, and Fitch were more likely to make
large downgrades from the lowest investment grade than from other
grades, possibly because these agencies had decided to define their lowest
investment grade quite broadly. 173 While the SEC arguably lacks comp-
etence to mandate rating procedures and methodologies, these results
suggest that the rating process itself could be a source of inaccuracy.
Congress would have been foolish to believe that the SEC could
outperform rating agencies as risk predictors, but its current approach
assumes that rating agencies would at least attempt to make their
procedures and methodologies accurate. As currently constituted, how-
ever, the regulatory framework allows agencies to intentionally maintain
procedures and methodologies that produce low quality ratings. As rev-
ealed in the October 2008 House Oversight Committee hearing, S&P
developed a superior rating model as early as 2001. 174 Senior management
knew this model existed yet declined to implement it because increasing
accuracy would not increase revenues. 175 Absent incentives for agencies to
create and maintain ratings through reliable processes, ensuring that
agencies comply with their stated procedures and methodologies is of
negligible value.
Perhaps worse, co-opting NRSROs into a regulatory role has caused
them to intentionally and expressly sacrifice rating accuracy. For example,
in recent years, Moody's has published a "Special Comment" analyzing
172. See Beaver, Shakespeare & Soliman, supra note 45, at 32-34.
173. See JOHNSON, supra note 45, at 3.
174. See Financial Crisis Hearing, supra note 7, at 6 (statement of Frank Raiter, for-
mer executive, S&P).
175. Id.
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the "[t]radeoff' between accuracy and stability reflected in their ratings. 
176
Moody's justifies sacrificing some accuracy due to need for stability in an
effective regulatory regime. For example, "volatility reduces the efficiency
of ratings as tools of governance. In many of these cases, certain rating
changes lead an agent to take an action that is costly to undo if the rating
change is subsequently reversed.' ' 177 This is especially true in the case of
rules such as 2a-7, which require a portfolio manager to divest if
investment grade holdings are downgraded to speculative. 17 8 Having to
frequently buy and sell securities due to volatile ratings would create a
sizeable rise in transaction costs that would, if market swings were
sufficiently severe, more than offset the rule's intended benefits.
Moreover, the Special Comments make it clear that Moody's Investor
Services in fact serves not investors with this policy, but a range of
"market participants"-including regulators and issuers-who have "diff-
erent needs."179 Therefore, Congress at once complained that rating chan-
ges lagged the market and then purposely avoided addressing meth-
odologies that by their express terms produced this very result. Finally,
while the CRARA may effectively require NRSROs to manage conflicts
of interest, the Act thoroughly defers to the NRSRO business model and
ignores the possibility that some incentives in the business model itself are
inherently at odds with accuracy. Ratings will be more accurate without
these conflicts than with them, but the Act's accountability provisions are
at best a partial solution as they address only the specific, and not the
systemic, causes of inaccuracy.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
While numerous suggestions have been advanced to improve the
accuracy of credit ratings, the options are essentially two: remove the
NRSRO designation in an attempt to restore the reputation mechanism, or
avoid the need for the reputation mechanism by conditioning the valuable
NRSRO designation, indirectly or directly, on accuracy. 180 Congress and
176. See, e.g., Moody's Investors Service, Special Comment, Analyzing the Tradeoff
Between Ratings Accuracy and Stability 1 (Sept. 2006), available at http://www.moodys.
com/cust/content.ashx?source=staticcontent/Free%20pagesCredit%2OPolicy%2OResearh
/documents/current/tradeoff.pdf.
177. Id. at 2.
178. 17 C.F.R. 270.2a-7(b)(5) (2006).
179. Moody's Investors Service, supra note 176, at 1.
180. Using a valuable carrot like the ability to grant regulatory licenses is an attractive
and perhaps necessary way to induce changes in the rating agency behavior. The ability
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the SEC have chosen a variation of the second approach. Specifically, they
have conditioned the NRSRO designation on rating agencies subjecting
themselves to a mix of disclosure requirements, conflicts rules, and
enforcement authority. 181 They believe these measures will lead to incr-
eased competition, transparency, and accountability, which will in turn
produce accuracy. As described above, there are good reasons to believe
this approach will not work. Rather, any viable reform effort must remove
the NRSRO framework, remove the need for reputed intermediaries, or
condition the NRSRO designation directly on rating accuracy. This Part
briefly explores these options and finds that while each has significant
benefits and drawbacks, eliminating the NRSRO designation will improve
ratings quality and is feasible even in the near term.
A. Abandoning Reputation: Using the NRSRO Designation to Control
Rating Agency Behavior
1. Prohibiting the Issuer-Pays Business Model
Of the proposals that leave the NRSRO structure intact, prohibiting
NSRSOs from receiving compensation from issuers is perhaps the most
well known. Instead of assuming the reputation mechanism works, as the
CRARA does, this measure obviates the need for it. Prohibiting the issuer-
pays business model, the industry's primary conflict of interest, would
ensure that rating agencies were no longer financially dependent on those
seeking high ratings.'
82
Despite the directness and seeming simplicity of this approach, a
vision for implementing this reform has not been cogently articulated,
likely because there are substantial barriers to forcing a fundamental
change on the credit rating business model.
to regulate is limited in this context as several lower courts have held that credit ratings
are financial opinions protected by the First Amendment. See, e.g., Partnoy, supra note
19, at 61.
181. Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
182. It is possible that investors paying subscription fees to credit rating agencies
would also pose a conflict of interest. For example, if a particular investor held a long
position on a certain bond that investor would oppose any downgrade. As Sean Egan,
President of Egan-Jones Rating Company, an investor-paid credit rating agency, notes,
rating agencies usually do not know whether their investor clients are long or short on a
particular issue. See Comment Letter of Egan-Jones Rating Co. (Sept. 5. 2008), available
at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-19-08/s71908-50.pdf.
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As discussed above, regulations practically require certified ratings for
every debt issuance. Currently, issuers can meet that need by purchasing
ratings. If issuers were no longer able to purchase ratings, however,
NRSROs would need either regulatory or market incentives to issue
ratings for every debt product. The changes in cost structures that caused
rating agencies to abandon the investor subscription model in the first
place are, however, even more pronounced today. The major rating agen-
cies switched to an issuer-pays system in the early 1970s because mutual
funds changed the demand structure with their need for a broader and
better-monitored supply of ratings.183 As a result, "[t]he traditional subsc-
ription fees could not offset the increasing costs." 184 The complexity of
structured products and the vast increase in the number of debt issuances
since the 1970s has only increased these costs further. It is therefore
unlikely that subscription services that currently constitute only ten
percent of NRSRO revenue could provide sufficient revenue to support
rating all debt issuances over both stagnant and robust market cycles. It is
even harder to imagine a way to mandate that private credit rating
agencies rate every product when the market does not support it. To do
this would require that the government enter the business of subsidizing
credit ratings, an idea which no one supports.
2. Regulating Accuracy Directly
A second approach is to condition the NRSRO status directly on
NRSROs maintaining a specified level of accuracy, as measured against
historical averages for the same ratings grade of the same agency.
Professor John C. Coffee, Jr. of Columbia Law School once argued to
Congress in favor of regulating accuracy in this manner.' 85 Instead of
conditioning NRSRO status on changes to the credit rating agency
business model or on other efforts designed to address conflicts of interest,
he would have given the SEC the authority to specify maximum default
rates for each rating category over a five year period.186 If an agency's
183. DrrrRICH, supra note 20, at 19.
184. Id.
185. See Turmoil in Credit Markets, supra note 37, at 14 (statement of John C. Coffee,
Jr., Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia Law School). More recently, Professor
Coffee has instead focused on requiring credit rating agencies to perform due diligence
and subjecting them to civil liability. See Examining Proposals to Enhance the
Regulation of the Credit Rating Agencies Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 3 (2009) [hereinafter Examining Proposals] (statement of
Professor John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia Law School).
186. Structured Finance Market Hearing, supra note 76, at 14-16.
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accuracy for a particular grade fell out of the mandated range, the agency
would "forfeit the ability to serve as an NRSRO for the given rating or
product as to which it was demonstrably inaccurate." 18 The goal for
Professor Coffee was to "sever the link between providing information
and conferring legal protection" so as to "counterbalance the current
incentives for grade inflation."' 188 The merit of this proposal is that it
provides a strong incentive for NRSROs to ensure that their ratings
achieve a specified degree of accuracy, yet avoids regulating NRSRO
procedures and methodologies.
One difficulty with this proposal is that it invites the NRSROs to game
the system. By focusing on long-term accuracy, it fails to address the
short-term failures to downgrade prevalent in both the 2001-2002 and
2007-2008 downturns. Rating agencies could exploit this oversight by
rating conservatively during bull markets, thereby building up an accuracy
reserve that they could then spend by delaying downgrades when markets
turned south and defaults increased. To address this possibility, there
should be varying permissible default rates over different time periods.
Specifically, any similar reform measure should allow a larger variation
from the historical average for a particular grade over shorter trailing
timeframes, but should allow less deviation at longer historical horizons.
Second and more problematically, this proposal incorporates rating
scales controlled by the rating agencies, providing incentives for rating
agencies to subvert the accuracy requirement either by changing the
default rates under their existing rating scales, or by changing the scales
themselves. 189 For example, upon learning that their AA ratings could no
longer have a default rate greater than their historical three percent
average, Moody's could recalibrate its ratings to make them uniformly
more cons-ervative. Issuers and investors would adjust to the new system
while the rating agencies would have bought themselves room for
subsequent ratings inflation. The only way to avoid this type of mani-
pulation in a system where credit rating agencies have incentives to rate
inaccurately is to proscribe it. This would require regulating rating agency
procedures and methodologies, something Congress has been loathe to do
and which the CRARA prohibits.
187. Id. at 14.
188. Id.
189. It is worth remembering here that the major rating agencies provide ratings as
relative measures of creditworthiness and do not reference an absolute probability of
default. These figures are instead calculated in hindsight based on historical default
percentages.
427
428 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1:391
3. Restoring the Reputation Mechanism: Abandoning the NRSRO
Designation
In the alternative, divesting NRSROs of their regulatory power could
improve rating accuracy. Scholars, legislators, and regulators have debated
this idea, yet differences over everything from how to disconnect rating
agencies from regulation, to what risk measures regulations should be inv-
oked in the absence of certified ratings, to even the fundamental rationale
for this reform, have impeded its progress. This Part reasserts the correct
theoretical underpinning of this change and describes a means of imple-
menting it that is politically tenable and advances the investor-protective
regulatory objectives that NRSRO ratings were meant to serve.
Regulators should decouple NRSRO ratings from regulatory authority
as a means of restoring the reputation mechanism. Removing regulatory
value from ratings would cause issuers to purchase ratings only to the
extent they could convey useful information to prospective investors.
Based on this rationale, Frank Partnoy has suggested-as long ago as 1999
and as recently as April 2009-replacing current regulatory reliance on
ratings with ratings triggers based on credit spreads. 90 Since regulations
subject to market volatility could impose large transaction costs by requ-
iring regulated institutions to sell their positions frequently, he suggests
using rolling averages. 191 Using this system, regulations could maintain
both accuracy and a measure of stability.
Similarly, Professor Lawrence White has suggested to Congress that it
dismantle the NRSRO framework. In place of NRSRO ratings, White
would place the burden on regulated institutions to justify that their bond
portfolios are safe. 192 While White's reasoning was less explicit than
Partnoy's, he reasoned that removing the "force of law" that Congress and
the SEC had bestowed upon NRSRO would free institutional participants
in bond markets to consider a much broader range of information in
190. Comments on Roundtable on Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies of Frank
Partnoy, George E. Barrett Professor of Law and Finance, University of San Diego
School of Law, available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-579/4579-6.pdf [hereinafter
Partnoy, Roundtable]; Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two
Thumbs Down for the Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 704-07 (1999)
[hereinafter Partnoy, Siskel and Ebert].
191. Partnoy, Siskel and Ebert, supra note 190, at 706 ("The credit spread measure
could be an average over some period (e.g., 30 to 90 days) to smooth the effects of sud-
den market movements based on temporary supply/demand factors or liquidity con-
straints.").
192. See Examining Proposals, supra note 185, at 2, 3 (statement of Lawrence J.
White, Professor of Economics, Stem School of Business, New York University).
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assessing the risk of their investments. 193 Therefore, White too seems to
recognize that regulations force issuers to purchase certified ratings.
Ironically, even the SEC's 2008 rulemaking proposals suggested,
among other things, removing certain regulatory references to NRSROs.
The rules would have largely placed the onus of risk-assessment on
institutional investors and fund managers. 194 As described above in Part
II.A.3, the SEC reasoned that by removing the "official seal of approval"
from NRSRO ratings, these reforms could reduce over-reliance on a few
rating agencies, thereby increasing competition. 195 At this point, Partnoy's
reasoning has all but disappeared, and the central concern seems to be one
not of perverse rating agency incentives, but of distorted investor percep-
tions. The SEC seems to argue that investors will trust NRSRO ratings
because the SEC, by certifying selected agencies, has put the force of its
own reputation behind their accuracy. As described above, Comment
Letter reaction to this proposal was overwhelmingly negative. Com-
menters regularly asserted that (1) NRSRO ratings provided an important
baseline of investor protection, 196 (2) placing risk-assessment respon-
sibility directly on fund managers was inappropriate, 197 and (3) investors
simply do not overly rely on NRSRO ratings because SEC regulations
imply that such ratings are the sole source of useful credit risk
information. 198 Ultimately the SEC abandoned the proposal. While
Partnoy opines that removing the NRSRO mechanism "does not appear to
be possible or likely, at least in the short run,"'199 an approach that provides
a cogent, supportable rationale, replaces NRSRO ratings with an objective
baseline level of risk, and avoids forcing those without adequate resources
to certify risk would be both effective and less likely to encounter wide-
spread opposition.
In short, Partnoy's rationale is the right one. Congress and the SEC
should embrace removing regulatory reliance on NRSRO ratings as a
means of restoring the reputation mechanism. His solution, however, is
193. Id. at 2.
194. See supra Part II.A.3.
195. IOSCO REPORT, supra note 130, at 8.
196. Comment Letter of The Vanguard Group, supra note 158, at 1.
197. Comment Letter of Prudential Series Fund, supra note 159, at 1-2.
198. Comment Letter of The American Securitization Forum, supra note 160, at 12.
199. Partnoy, Roundtable, supra note 190, at 3. Despite this grim assessment, support
for this position has been growing. In the October 2008 House hearing, Frank Raiter
suggested scrapping the NRSRO system as part of a larger solution. Financial Crisis
Hearing, supra note 7, at 8. Jerome Fons acknowledged that it might be a good idea. Id.
at 6. Representative Tierney suggested that the government "get out of the business of
certifying agencies." Id. at 75.
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incomplete. Market measures may not exist for illiquid securities, and as
the credit crisis has demonstrated, market measures do not always exist to
value every normally liquid debt product. 200 Therefore, the judgment of
regulated investors should be combined with market measures to form a
cohesive approach to regulation. Specifically, regulated investors should
have the primary responsibility to certify risk, but should be able to rely on
credit spreads as a safe harbor. In most situations, regulated investors
would inevitably rely on credit spreads. Where market measures were not
available, they would have to rely on their own judgment or that of an
adviser. Combining these two approaches has the tripartite benefit of
enhancing baseline levels of regulatory risk protection, assuring regulated
investors that their debt holdings comply with these regulations, and
restoring economic incentives that will prompt credit rating agencies to
produce accurate ratings.
CONCLUSION
The CRARA, while moderately proficient on its own terms, makes the
more fundamental mistake of assuming that NRSROs value investor trust
first and last. In reality, they value it last, if at all. As a result, competition
and transparency-bulwarks of the CRARA's structure-facilitate a
market for investor service that simply does not exist. NRSROs currently
lack incentives to preserve their reputation for accuracy when it conflicts
with selling regulatory licenses and garnering short-term profits. Repl-
acing the NRSRO mechanism with a system that shifts ultimate respons-
ibility from certified third parties to regulated investors, but allows such
investors to largely rely on market measures of credit risk, will improve
the performance of credit rating agencies, enhance the protection of
investors, and encounter less credible resistance. Without further reform,
inaccuracy will remain endemic to the NRSRO regime and another round
of painful, dilatory downgrades should be expected with the next market
downturn.
200. DITTRICH, supra note 20, at 134 ("The biggest disadvantage of market-based
measures is their limited reach. There are many illiquid securities and new issues cannot
be rated at all. Since a full reach is a knock-out criterion for any stand-alone risk measure,
there is no way to implement a system of purely market-based regulation.").
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